A male sitatunga Chopper, a recent addition to the John Ball Zoo, killed on Tuesday after being attacked and killed by Jahari, the zoo's new pygmy hippo. On Tuesday night, John Ball Zoo made the announcement.

The new multi-species habitat at the zoo, which includes pygmy hippos, intended to include Chopper.

The zoo claims that during the past month, staff members successfully performed visual introductions between Chopper and Jahari.

"Chopper", (male sitatunga)

Tuesday, when qualified animal care employees attempted a controlled introduction, they claim Jahari abruptly attacked Chopper.

The CEO of the John Ball Zoo, Peter D'Arienzo, remarked, "This sad incident reminds us that despite enormous precautionary measures taken by zoo staff over the last several weeks, the behavior of wild animals can be unpredictable."

Although they made an effort to preserve Chopper, they were unsuccessful in doing so.

D'Arienzo continued, "At John Ball Zoo, giving our animals the best care possible is our first priority. We are profoundly sorry by the passing of Chopper, who was loved by all the team who looked after him and who are currently grieving this loss.

In accordance with its policies and standards for animal care, the zoo promises to conduct a thorough investigation into the occurrence.

Prior to "Hippopalooza," which is slated to take place from Friday, June 2 through Sunday, June 4, this tragedy occurred.

The three-day celebration will feature live music, animal activities, and specialty foods to mark the opening of the zoo's brand-new, cutting-edge pygmy hippo exhibit.

Here is the John Ball Zoo's whole statement from Tuesday night.

"John Ball Zoo is deeply saddened to announce our male sitatunga, Chopper, died Tuesday. Chopper was slated to be part of our new multi-species habitat, featuring pygmy hippos. After successful visual introductions between Chopper and the pygmy hippo throughout the last month, trained animal care staff were attempting a controlled introduction of our pygmy hippo with Chopper inside their habitat when the pygmy hippo suddenly attacked Chopper. Zoo staff separated the animals immediately. Our animal care team provided emergency care, but efforts to resuscitate Chopper were unsuccessful. Consistent with our animal care protocols and procedures, a full review of the incident is underway. The Zoo has successfully introduced species many times, and our staff was thoroughly prepared for this introduction. This sad incident reminds us that despite enormous cautionary measures taken by Zoo staff over the last several weeks, the behavior of wild animals can be unpredictable. At John Ball Zoo, providing world-class care for our animals is our number one priority, and we are deeply saddened by the loss of Chopper, who was loved by all the staff that cared for him and who are today grieving this loss."

Under the Animal Welfare Act the regulations state in  Section  3.133 - (Separation) requires that Animals housed in the same primary enclosure must be compatible. Animals shall not be housed near animals that interfere with their health or cause them discomfort.

The John Ball Zoo is accredited by the Association of Zoos and Aquariums, (AZA) who have been experiencing a voluminous array of animal deaths.

Read more related AZA stories HERE.

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between the public and the animals, and direct physical contact is permitted or

encouraged. Examples may include hand-feeding animals, photo opportunities, other

hands-on encounters with animals, or rides on animals, all of which take place

without any barriers in place between the public and the animal(s).

physical contact is not permitted. Examples may include aviary-type exhibits,

kangaroo walk-abouts, or drive-through parks where guests are in “closed” vehicles

and are unable to feed or touch the animals.

no barrier between the public and animals, and direct physical contact is not permitted.

* NAWA is not affiliated in anyway with the USDA/APHIS government agency.

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- Section § 3.78 - Outdoor housing facilities, (e) Public barriers.

Fixed public exhibits housing nonhuman primates, such as zoos, must have a barrier between the primary enclosure and the public at any time the public is present, in order to restrict physical contact between the public and the nonhuman primates. Nonhuman primates used in trained animal acts or in uncaged public exhibits must be under the direct control and supervision of an experienced handler or trainer at all times when the public is present. Trained nonhuman primates may be allowed physical contact with the public, but only if they are under the direct control and supervision of an experienced handler or trainer at all times during the contact.

“only human beings and legislatively created entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law.”  

“An animal such as a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner that the legal system would recognize.  That incapacity exists in perpetuity such that it would be difficult to say that a court — or any human being — may actually discern the animal’s own interest in pursuing a legal action.”

“Who is the appropriate agent to make an assumption on behalf of an animal, to create that legal fiction?”

“however worthy and high minded the motives of ‘next friends’ may be, they inevitably run the risk of making the actual [party] a pawn to be manipulated on a chessboard larger than his own case.”

Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 431 (9th Cir, 2018) (read about the selfie monkey case here).  The Ninth Circuit notably called animal next-friend standing “particularly susceptible to abuse” and that organizations could “use it to advance their own institutional goals with no means to curtail those actions.”

Ninth Circuit Court file photo

The Oregon Court of Appeals went on to reject appellants’ argument that animals should be afforded the same legal rights as incompetent or incapacitated persons — an argument often asserted by those pursuing animal “personhood” cases — finding that while humans have “millennia of experience understanding the interests and desire of humankind,” no human can ever “credibly articulate [an animal’s] interests or goals.”  Id. at 448.  In doing, the court definitively rejected the notion that an animal activist group or sympathizer will always have an animal’s best interest in mind and that to find otherwise, animals may well be “left at the mercy of the institutional actor to advance its own interests.”

As is routine in animal “personhood” cases, the court undertook an extensive analysis of the common law and concluded that under Oregon law, the right to sue and redress a violation of rights “is and always has been [the right of] a human being or an entity created by human law.”  Id. at 450.

The court saw no reason to depart from that well-settled common law doctrine.  Animals have not been considered persons — either natural or artificial — capable of holding and asserting rights under the law and are viewed as property in the law.  The court noted, however, that while Oregon’s animal welfare statutes impose “one of the nation’s most protective statutory schemes,” this statutory scheme does not confer legal rights on animals  — it merely qualifies a person’s right to exercise otherwise absolute dominion and control over an animal (e.g. as per Oregon Revised Statutes 167.305,  mandating care for animals in ways that minimize pain, stress, fear and suffering).  Id. at 452.

The Court of Appeals recognized that the state legislature is the proper forum to determine, as a matter of policy, how the law should view animals. It did not foreclose the possibility that the Legislature could create a limited statutory cause of action allowing a person to sue on an animal’s behalf for specified damages in specific instances.   Id. at 458, n.11.  But the Court recognized that extending to animals the right to sue in tort would have “profound implications” and, like the trial court it noted: “we, too, are unable to take that leap.”

This Court of Appeals decision marks yet another legal defeat in a string of defeats for the animal legal personhood movement. Read more from the source.

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[D]espite the awesome power of the writ of habeas corpus and its enduring use throughout the centuries, no court of this State—or any other—has ever held the writ applicable to a nonhuman animal. Nothing in our precedent or, in fact, that of any other state or federal court, provides support for the notion that the writ of habeas corpus is or should be applicable to nonhuman animals.  The selective capacity for autonomy, intelligence, and emotion of a particular nonhuman animal species is not a determinative factor in whether the writ is available as such factors are not what makes a person detained qualified to seek the writ.  Rather, the great writ protects the right to liberty of humans because they are humans with certain fundamental liberty rights recognized by law Nonhuman animals are not, and never have been, considered “persons” with a right to “liberty” under New York law.  [Slip op. at 8-9].

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